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Interdisciplinary Impact Analysis of Privacy
in Social Networks
Michael Netter, Sebastian Herbst, and G€unther Pernul
Abstract The rise of the social web has traditionally been accompanied by privacy
concerns. Research on social web privacy has been conducted from various
viewpoints including legal, social, and the computer sciences. In this chapter, we
propose an interdisciplinary approach to capture the multidimensional concept of
privacy. For this purpose, we developed a three-layered framework to systemati-
cally analyze the privacy impact of various research directions. In addition, we
conducted an interdisciplinary literature analysis, highlighting areas for improve-
ment as well dependencies between different research directions.
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the evolution of the World Wide Web led to the significant
growth of Online Social Networks (OSNs), which are receiving much attention in
the research community. While social networks have always been an important part
of daily life, the advent of Web 2.0 and its easy-to-use services increasingly shift
social life to their online counterparts. OSNs provide an infrastructure for commu-
nication, information, and self-expression, as well as for building and maintaining
relationships with other users.
The increase in relevance and the quantity of social web services has been
accompanied by privacy concerns. On one hand, these worries have arisen due to
the prevalent oligopolistic social web landscape with only a few service providers
possessing large databases with millions of user profiles. On the other hand, privacy
concerns focus on the challenges of presenting different facets of the self to
different audiences, and to keep those views consistent. While this bears a
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resemblance to managing different appearances of the self in the real world, the
inherent properties of mediated OSN communication (e.g., the permanency and
searchability of personal information) places privacy at risk. Although privacy
controls are in place to currently restrict access to personal data, users seem to be
shortsighted with respect to future aspects of current behavior [1].
Both aforementioned areas of privacy have been studied extensively by
researchers through various viewpoints such as law, the social sciences, and
computer science. However, the ambiguous nature of privacy and the multiple
definitions available impede a consistent view of the concept. Robert C. Post
notes that privacy “. . . is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and
contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I
sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.” [2].
In this chapter, we stress the need to integrate insights from diverse areas of
research on social web privacy. We contribute to this field by providing a
framework with which to decompose social web privacy and systematically
analyze the effects of different research directions. Subsequently, we applied the
proposed framework to the body of research. Our results highlight areas for
improvement as well as dependencies between different research directions,
emphasizing the necessity to foster interdisciplinary research on social web
privacy.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we give an
overview of related work. In Sect. 3, we decompose social web privacy and transfer
its components into a framework for analyzing the concept from different research
directions. We apply our framework on the existing body of research,
differentiating between privacy issues related to OSN users and OSN service
providers in Sects. 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, in Sect. 6, we summarize our
findings and highlight areas for future work.
2 Related Work
In this section, we present existing approaches that aim to integrate several research
directions in order to create a holistic view of privacy. Approaches to particular
aspects of privacy are discussed in our detailed impact analysis of the various
privacy perspectives in Sects. 4 and 5.
Spiekermann and Cranor provide a framework with which to build privacy-
friendly systems [3]. They distinguish between privacy-by-policy and privacy-by-
architecture. The former is a legally-driven approach that focuses on notifying the
user and obtaining consent prior to processing personal data. The latter is a
technically-driven approach to minimize the collection of personal data without
limiting functionality. However, their approach does not consider the social per-
spective of privacy and focuses on privacy in general, whereas our work examines
social web privacy. The importance of social web privacy is acknowledged by the
European Union, which is promoting several related research projects. For
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example, PADGETS1 uses an interdisciplinary approach to strengthen users’ privacy
while harnessing social network data for policy making. Similarly, the European
research project PrimeLife2 has developed a framework with which to analyze
privacy issues related to other OSN users [4]. Project results show that privacy
issues arise when legal or social norms are disregarded or technical safeguards are
circumvented. Depending on the owner’s initial categorization of personal data
(private, semi-public, or public), the PrimeLife framework allows an estimation of
potential privacy risks. Unlike our approach, this work does not take privacy threats
stemming from OSN service providers into account, but solely focuses on user-
related privacy issues. PRESCIENT,3 another EU-funded project, conducted an in-
depth study of privacy conceptualizations [5]. It takes a legal, social, economic, and
ethical perspective of privacy, highlighting similarities and interdependencies. This
project’s results provide useful insights to help understand the concept of privacy;
however, the analyses do not follow a structured approach, as described in this
chapter.
3 Proposed Three-Layered Framework
In this section, we give an overview of our proposed framework. The framework
provides a general-purpose structure for social web privacy research domains.
Subsequently, the concept of privacy is broken up into a set of characteristics that
are used to conduct our impact analysis, as described in Sects. 4 and 5.
3.1 Overview
In their conceptualization of privacy in 1890 as “the right to be let alone,” Warren
and Brandeis were one of the first to recognize the multidimensionality of the
privacy concept [6]. Until then, privacy threats were primarily related to potential
physical harm [7]. The rise of the information age led to a large number of privacy
conceptualizations from a variety of directions such as the social sciences, law,
architecture, urban design, health sciences, and computer and information sciences.
In their work to structure the concept of privacy, Patil and Kobsa introduce three
main perspectives from which to describe and analyze privacy [8]:
• Legal: This aspect focuses on laws and policies that protect the individual from
corporations, governments, and other individuals. For example, the European
1 http://www.padgets.eu/
2 http://www.primelife.eu/
3 http://www.prescient-project.eu/
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Data Protection Framework promotes informational self-determination that
emphases an individual’s rights to control the collection and use of personal
data [9].
• Technical: This aspect translates norms and regulations into technical
specifications. The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) is a popular
example of enhancing the individual’s ability to control information disclosure
by technical means [10].
• Social: This aspect concentrates on managing social relationships and the
boundaries between private and public life. For instance, Nissenbaum describes
privacy as contextual integrity, arguing that personal information is published
within a well-defined social context [11]. Privacy is breached if personal infor-
mation is available outside its intended context.
In this study, we adapt this three-layered view and extend it to cover privacy
risks in online social networks. Typically, two distinct areas of research can be
observed [12, 13] as depicted in Fig. 1:
• OSN Service Providers: Research in this direction includes the means to legally
bind service providers to comply with current legislation, to increase end-user
trust in service providers, and to provide technical safeguards; e.g., by crypto-
graphic or steganographic means [14].
Fig. 1 Classification of OSN privacy research
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• OSN Users: This research aims to recreate the different social contexts of the real
world; e.g., by supporting an individual to segment social streams for specific
audiences, and by providing the means to have different digital identities [15].
The two aforementioned research directions are combined with the three
perspectives on privacy (legal, technical, and social), resulting in our proposed
framework. The framework is shown in Table 1, with the cells containing concepts
that become relevant for their respective dimension. Note that the three dimensions
are not mutually exclusive – they are interdependent. In Sect. 3.2, the two research
directions (OSN service providers and OSN users) are further decomposed into a set
of privacy characteristics.
3.2 Characteristics Used to Analyze Social Web Privacy
This section outlines fundamental characteristics of privacy derived from a litera-
ture review. These privacy characteristics are not exhaustive; rather, they aim to
provide a solid foundation for analyzing the impact of the three perspectives on
privacy. The characteristics are described in detail as follows.
3.2.1 Data Sovereignty
Data sovereignty describes the extent to which an individual is able to control the
processing of his personal data [16]; i.e., his informational self-determination.
Personal data in an OSN is typically available in a structured manner and can
easily be copied, linked, aggregated, and transferred [4]. Consequently, it is difficult
for an OSN user to control the flow of personal information, and thus privacy is
placed at risk. The problem increases because the OSN typically lacks the spatial,
Table 1 Proposed three-layered framework for analyzing social web privacy
Privacy issues related to
OSN users OSN service providers
Legal International standards (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) privacy
principles, EU data protection
framework), national laws
International standards (OECD
privacy principles, EU data
protection framework), national
laws, privacy policies
Technical Cryptography and steganography,
privacy agents, fine-grained access
control models, visualization
of personal data
Cryptography and steganography,
privacy agents
Social Peer-group pressure, trust relationships,
tie strength, privacy awareness
Privacy awareness, pressure
of the media
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social, and temporal boundaries of the real world, which limits the flow of personal
information by default [17].
3.2.2 Data Transience
Data transience relates to the loss of personal information over time, which can be
considered a typical characteristic of real-world communication [4]. In contrast, the
mediated communication of OSNs results in permanent storage of personal infor-
mation. As Mayer-Sch€onberger noted, “Since the beginning of time, for us humans,
forgetting has been the norm and remembering the exception. [. . .] Today, with the
help of widespread technology, forgetting has become the exception, and
remembering the default.” [18]. In addition, this permanency of personal informa-
tion poses a great challenge to privacy, since we are no longer free to construct our
future identities because contradictory information may be available online [19].
3.2.3 Protection Against Profiling
Protection against profiling subsumes an individual’s ability to prevent an adver-
sary from collecting, aggregating, and linking personal data in order to create a
digital dossier [20]. Such profiling threats are increased if secondary data such as
location (e.g. from mobile phones) and connection logs are linked to existing OSN
profiles [21]. The relevance of these threats is underlined by sophisticated attacks
such as stealing-reality attacks [22]. The current landscape of social web service
providers, with their targeted advertising-centered business models and large iden-
tity silos, adds to this threat.
3.2.4 Audience Segregation
Originally developed by Goffman [23], audience segregation states that each
individual performs multiple and possibly conflicting roles in everyday life, and it
needs to segregate the audiences for each role in a way that people from one
audience cannot witness a role performance intended for another audience, thereby
keeping a consistent self-image and maintaining privacy [24]. In current OSNs,
contacts are typically classified as “friends,” making it difficult to selectively share
personal information with a specific group of people. As a result, privacy is
threatened because a large audience might have access to personal information.
3.2.5 Privacy Awareness
Privacy awareness encompasses the attention, perception, and cognition of the
personal information others have received and how this information is or may be
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processed [25]. An individual’s awareness of privacy risk is a prerequisite for
privacy-preserving behavior.
3.2.6 Transparency
With regard to OSN service providers, transparency describes the user’s ability to
be informed of processing and dissemination practices [26]. Taking a social point
of view, transparency implies the ability of an individual to understand the flow of
personal information within an OSN and to recognize contextual boundaries, which
is important for contextual integrity [11].
3.2.7 Enforcement
Enforcement is an individual’s means to bring his privacy preferences into force.
With regard to OSN service providers and OSN users, it describes the extent to
which an individual can control adherence to privacy settings and limitations [27].
3.2.8 Summary
Figure 1 provides a summary of the presented characteristics of privacy. Most
properties apply to privacy issues related to social web users and service providers;
audience segregation only applies to the former, and protection against profiling
only applies to the latter.
3.3 Classification Scheme
The analysis of each privacy characteristic is based on a structured scheme. First,
legal aspects are analyzed, highlighting their impact on privacy issues related to
OSN users and OSN service providers. Second, the effects of existing technical
approaches for enhancing social web privacy are discussed. Finally, the
implications of social norms on strengthening privacy in a given scenario are
examined.
Additionally, for each privacy characteristic, a visualization of the classification
and the effect is provided. A tripartite diagram is used to represent the legal,
technical and social dimensions. In this diagram, a colored circle represents the
impact (dark blue indicates a major impact, mid-blue a medium impact, and light
blue a minor impact).
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4 Privacy Issues Related to Social Web Users
In this section, we describe an impact analysis of privacy issues related to OSN
users. The results are summarized in Sect. 4.7.
4.1 Data Sovereignty
From a legal point of view, laws and policies applicable to governing the exchange
and flow of personal information between people are typically not available. Thus,
the legal dimension does not contribute to data sovereignty with regard to other
OSN users (no impact).
In addition to the legal dimension of data sovereignty, several technical approaches
have been proposed to support a context-sensitive disclosure of personal data in an
attempt to strengthen data sovereignty. For example, access control models that
enable the user to map their real world trust relationships to OSNs have been
introduced [28]. Such technical approaches, in general, attempt to recreate real
world social norms. Thus, they can be considered a useful means to strengthen data
sovereignty, but their overall impact isminor due to their limited supportive character.
From a social point of view, data sovereignty is threatened if personal informa-
tion is taken out of its intended context. Tagging people on pictures – a common
feature of OSNs – is a typical example of losing control of personal data flow. Gross
and Acquisti argue that social norms can strengthen data sovereignty if the fine-
grained social relations of the real world can be transferred to OSNs, as these foster
reliability and predictability in the behavior of other users [20]. However, adherence
to social norms highly depends on the trust relationship between two users, which
are commonly divided into weak ties and strong ties [29]. Strong ties typically reflect
relations with well-known acquaintances, and an abuse of confidence is likely to
have a negative impact on the associated real-world relationship [29]. In contrast,
studies indicate that users tend to have increasingly weak ties in OSNs, lacking fine-
grained social relations [30], [20]. Individuals are commonly viewed as “contacts”
or are even called “friends.” Examining the impact on privacy issues related to other
OSN users, unauthorized disclosure could primarily be regarded a social problem
that relies on strong ties to be effective. As a consequence, the overall impact of the
social aspect is medium, due to the aforementioned prevalent weak ties of current
OSNs. Figure 2a illustrates our findings regarding data sovereignty.
4.2 Data Transience
Digitally mediated communication differs from real world communication; it adds
persistence, searchability, replicability, and scalability by default [17]. However,
other OSN users typically cannot be legally forced to delete voluntarily shared
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personal information after a given period of time. As a consequence, there is no
legal impact on data transience regarding other users.
From a technical perspective, putting an expiry date on personal data is difficult
because digital information that is eventually available can easily be copied. While
approaches to technical data transience exist, successful attacks, as demonstrated in
[31], substantiate their minor impact.
From a social point of view, the permanency of personal information in OSNs
poses major challenges. According to Gross and Acquisti, OSN users are typically
unaware of existing data storage periods [20]. Consequently, we deduce a lack of
social norms regarding data persistence, and conclude that there is no impact
stemming from social aspects. A summary of our results is shown in Fig. 2b.
4.3 Audience Segregation
Managing the presentation of the self to different audiences is a social challenge
that is not governed by legal regulations (no impact). From a technical perspective,
audience segregation is partially implemented in common OSNs (e.g., Facebook
Groups4 and Google Circles5). In addition, audience segregation is starting to gain
attention in the research community. The prototypical OSN Clique,6 developed
within the PrimeLife project, for example, implements a fine-grained access control
mechanism to present each audience with a different view on a user’s identity [24].
Another approach presented in [32] automatically determines distinct audiences
based on the user’s relationships. In the current state, a medium impact of audience
Data sovereignty. Data transience. Audience segregation.
Impact: Dark=major, Mid=medium, Light=minor
Social
Technical Legal
Social
Technical Legal
Social
Technical Legal
a b c
Fig. 2 OSN user privacy analysis (Part 1)
4 http://www.facebook.com
5 https://plus.google.com
6 http://clique.primelife.eu/
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segregation on OSN user privacy can be deduced. However, increasing research
activity indicates future growth of the importance of technical means.
From the social point of view, audience segregation is a useful concept that can be
used to apply the theory of contextual integrity, as outlined in Sect. 3. Currently,
however, audience segregation is notwell supported in existingOSNs. Consequently,
users resort to behavioral strategies such as choosing appropriate communication
channels (e.g., private messages) and to mental strategies (e.g., self-censorship) [33].
Studies show that managing different audiences is a burden to many users, and
is rarely applied [34]. Based on the results of the aforementioned studies, only a
medium level of social impact of audience segregation on privacy can be inferred, as
shown in Fig. 2c.
4.4 Privacy Awareness
Awareness is an important requirement of social web privacy that affects many of
the characteristics presented in Sect. 3. However, from a regulatory point of view,
OSN user awareness cannot be legally enforced (no impact).
Technical aspects such as usable user interfaces influence perceived privacy
protection and the awareness of privacy risks [35]. However, similar to previous
characteristics, technical aspects only have a supportive character with which to
facilitate privacy awareness and draw attention to potential privacy violations
(minor impact).
Privacy awareness is primarily a social concept with a gap existing between
theoretical and practical privacy awareness [26]. Privacy awareness is backed by
further studies indicating that OSN users frequently underestimate privacy risks and
rarely use the available privacy settings [20, 36]. According to Acquisti, immediate
gratification outweighs long-term privacy risk and leads to a myopic evaluation of
privacy risks [37]. As illustrated in Fig. 3a, there is a medium level of social impact
on privacy protection from other users due to the discrepancy between the theoreti-
cal and practical effects of privacy awareness.
Privacy awareness. Transparency. Enforcement.
Impact: Dark=major, Mid=medium, Light=minor 
Social
Technical Legal
Social
Technical Legal
Social
Technical Legal
a b c
Fig. 3 OSN user privacy analysis (Part 2)
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4.5 Transparency
Although similar to privacy awareness, transparency aims to enhance a user’s
understanding of the propagation of personal data within an OSN to better protect
the data from unauthorized access. From a legal perspective, an individual has few
means with which to force other users to make their spreading of others’ personal
data transparent because, typically, no applicable regulations exist.
Taking a technical point of view, transparency-enhancing approaches focusing
on logging and retrospective analysis of personal data disclosures have been
proposed [38]. Additionally, it has been shown that weak ties and loose sharing
preferences (e.g., friend-of-a-friend) may lead to a large personal network and
non-transparent personal data spreading [20]. Technical approaches to visually
improving personal network transparency have been proposed, underlining that
transparency strongly depends on the OSN service provider and related application
programming interfaces (APIs) [39]. Following this reasoning, we assigned a
medium level of technical impact because many transparency mechanisms rely
on APIs that are provided by OSN service providers.
Similar to the legal dimension, the spreading of personal information by other
OSN users is typically not governed by social norms, leading to no social impact on
transparency. The results of our analysis of data transparency are shown in Fig. 3b.
4.6 Enforcement
The enforcement of law is an inherent property of any legal system. In the context
of social web privacy, an individual can seek an injunction if reputation-damaging
information is published. However, legal remedies are not universally applicable to
the social web. Following the European Court of Justice, legal protection requires
personal information to be restricted to close friends and family members in order
to be applicable [40]. In addition, legal remedies only allow the suing others after a
privacy breach, thereby resulting in a minor overall impact of legal enforcement on
privacy protection against other users.
A technical means of redress may have a positive impact on the enforcement of
legal remedies. However, current OSNs differ widely in providing the technical
means to address problems (e.g., cyber-bullying) [41]. Thus, technical means are
considered to have only a supportive function with minor impact.
In investigating privacy enforcement from a social perspective, tie strength
plays an important role. In some cases, a specific group of an individual’s OSN
(e.g., family members) may have established social norms that allow each member
to employ peer-group pressure to enforce privacy interests [42]. Following the
reasoning in [20] that relationships in OSNs often consist of weak ties, the effect
of social norms on the enforcement of peer pressure can be considered minor.
Figure 3c summarizes these findings.
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4.7 Summary
Table 2 summarizes the results of our impact analysis using the proposed frame-
work. This section has described how privacy protection from other social web
users is predominately covered by social norms. This corresponds to the real world,
where users mainly rely on selective sharing of personal data and highly
differentiated relationships to ensure privacy. The mediated nature of OSNs (e.g.,
permanent storage and searchability of personal data) adds a new layer of complex-
ity that influences privacy because the informational environment of OSNs is
counterintuitive to the norms of personal data distribution in the real world. This
often leads to a violation of contextual integrity [43]. Table 2 shows that technical
approaches to privacy can be seen as a supportive means to translate social norms to
the OSNs with potentially increasing importance in the future. On the contrary,
legal measures play a minor role and are a last resort to retroactively punish privacy
violations. These observations correspond to those of Strahilevitz, who suggested
that the law does little to shape people’s actual expectations of privacy [44].
5 Privacy Issues Related to Service Providers
Following the analysis of privacy issues related to social web users, we considered
the impact of service provider-related privacy issues in this section. These results
were then summarized and integrated into our framework.
5.1 Data Sovereignty
To ensure data sovereignty, legal norms have been enacted to control the exploita-
tion of personal data by OSN service providers [40]. For instance, according to the
German Teleservices Act and the Federal Data Protection Act, service providers
require a user’s explicit consent to use personal data for advertising purposes [40].
Furthermore, legal requirements for OSN service providers comprise the secure
Table 2 Summary of OSN user-related privacy impact analysis
Data
sovereignty
Data
transience
Audience
segregation
Privacy
awareness Transparency Enforcement
Legal
Technical
Social
Impact: Dark ¼ major, Mid ¼ medium, Light ¼ minor
18 M. Netter et al.
storage of personal data and exclusion of search indexes by default. Consequently,
legal aspects have a high impact on strengthening an individual’s data sovereignty.
From a technical point of view, several approaches to facilitate data sovereignty
have been proposed (e.g. [14, 45]). These approaches rely on cryptographic and
steganographic means to effectively protect an individual’s personal data from
service provider access. Although they can easily be integrated into current OSN,
they commonly infringe the service provider’s general terms and conditions
because their business model typically relies on free access to personal data for
advertising purposes [4]. Hence, despite the theoretical effectiveness of the afore-
mentioned approaches, the practical difficulties lead to only a medium level of
technical impact on data sovereignty.
Commonly, OSN users do not have any social relationship with OSN service
providers. As a consequence, an individual cannot rely on social means to ensure
service provider adherence to data sovereignty. Therefore, there is no impact from
this dimension. Figure 4a shows that data sovereignty with regard to OSN service
providers is mainly legally driven with a medium level of technical influence.
5.2 Data Transience
Similar to data sovereignty, data transience is fully covered by legal norms and
regulations to be fulfilled by OSN service providers. Providers are required to
entitle a user to delete all personal data stored in a OSN profile and to cancel his
membership [40]. Similarly, the European Data Protection Framework requires
personal data to be removed if the purpose for which the data was collected ceases
to exist [9]. This places the user in a strong position and leads to a high legal impact
on data transience.
Approaches described in [31] can be applied to technically enforce data tran-
sience with respect to OSN service providers. However, their general impact can be
Data sovereignty. Data transience. Protection ag. profiling.
Impact: Dark=major, Mid=medium, Light=minor
Social
Technical Legal
Social
Technical Legal
Social
Technical Legal
a b c
Fig. 4 OSN service provider privacy analysis (Part 1)
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considered minor; in their general terms and conditions, most OSN service
providers prohibit any tools that place access restrictions on personal data.
Similar to the description of data sovereignty (see Sect. 5.1), the missing social
relationship between OSN users and OSN service providers leads to no social
impact on the enforcement of data transience. This is illustrated in Fig. 4b.
5.3 Protection Against Profiling
Privacy threats stemming from OSN service providers have been recognized in the
OECD privacy principles [46] and the EU Data Protection Framework [9], which
stipulates that data minimization is one of the key principles preventing service
providers from linking personal information and building digital dossiers. How-
ever, several of the underlying principles of the social web counteract data minimi-
zation. For example, the business models of OSN service providers mostly rely on
personal data being used for advertising purposes. As a consequence, several
personal attributes are mandatory for registration. Studies indicate that only 3 out
of 29 OSNs allow for a fully pseudonymous registration [41]. This leads to the
conclusion that despite existing legal regulations to protect the user against
profiling, the legal impact in practice can be considered minor.
Technically, the approaches presented in Sect. 5.1 can be applied to prevent
profiling. Other research directions include the application of user-centric identity
management systems on OSNs to strengthen user control, and to prevent service
provider and third party access without prior approval. Maliki and Seigneur focused
on the concept of Identity 2.0 and respective implementations [47]. They concluded
that technical approaches in practice only have a minor impact on protection against
profiling because the general terms and conditions of OSNs commonly prevent their
application.
Again, due to the typically missing strong ties between OSN users, social norms
are not applicable for protecting against profiling (no impact). Figure 4c highlights
the lack of social impact.
5.4 Privacy Awareness
Similar to user-related privacy threats (see Sect. 4.4), awareness is primarily
influenced through a social perspective, while legal and technical means do not
contribute at all.
For example, studies reveal that users of Facebook place more trust in the service
provider than in average Facebook users [36]. They also show that 56 % believe
that Facebook does not share personal information with third parties, and 70 %
believe that Facebook does not combine information about them collected from
other sources. Less than one out of four users claim to have read Facebook’s privacy
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policy. While privacy risks tend to remain invisible to the average user [48],
awareness increases if privacy-invading features are introduced such as Facebook’s
News Feed [49]. A high awareness is generally seen as a major obstacle in
generating revenue by OSN service providers [12]. This leads to the conclusion
that while awareness increases in exceptional situations, OSN users become accus-
tomed to privacy threats stemming from service providers, thus leading to a
medium social impact on privacy awareness (see Fig. 5a).
5.5 Transparency
The primary source of information used to assess the legal impact on transparency
is the service provider’s privacy policy. Bonneau and Preibusch extensively
analyzed the privacy policies of 45 OSN providers [41]. As a result, flaws in almost
all privacy policies, ranging from bad technical accessibility (e.g., by requiring
JavaScript) to extensive use of legal jargon that is far too difficult for ordinary users
to understand, have been identified. Other issues include a missing specification of
applicable national data protection laws and the nation in which the data is stored
and processed. These results show that there is no significant correlation between a
network’s privacy score and actually privacy practices.
A similar study on service provider transparency revealed that users are often
unable to determine the amount of personal data required prior to registration [26].
The study additionally shows that even upon request by e-mail, service providers
often do not provide adequate support to increase the transparency of their data
handling practices. Consequently, despite the existence of privacy policies as a
valuable legal means of fostering transparency, there is only a medium legal impact
due to the aforementioned restrictions in terms of practical implementation.
In addition to legal means, several technical approaches to service provider
transparency have been developed. P3P is a prominent example [10]. P3P requires
service providers to publish a machine-readable privacy policy that subsequently
Privacy Awareness. Transparency. Enforcement.
Impact: Dark=major, Mid=medium, Light=minor
Social
Technical Legal
Social
Technical Legal
Social
Technical Legal
a b c
Fig. 5 OSN service provider privacy analysis (Part 2)
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can be matched with the user’s predefined privacy preferences. However, most
OSN service providers do not provide a machine-readable version of their privacy
policy, thereby making P3P inapplicable [41]. Also, the task of defining privacy
preferences can hardly be executed by non-technical users [50]. Taking these
shortcomings into account, technical means have only a low impact on facilitating
transparency.
Considering transparency from a social perspective, media coverage plays an
important role in communicating the personal data handling practices of social web
service providers [41]. However, they typically do not provide a substantive
analysis of privacy problems; rather, they focus on partial aspects of privacy. The
minor impact of mass media on transparency is also supported by the lack of
privacy awareness (see Sect. 5.4). As illustrated in Fig. 5a, this leads to a minor
overall impact of social means with respect to fostering transparency.
5.6 Enforcement
The inherent enforceability of legal measures (see Sect. 4.6) also applies to OSN
service providers, and is reflected in the dominance of the aforementioned legal
impact. OSN service providers typically employ a privacy-by-policy approach
(e.g., as defined in [3]), notifying and obtaining the user’s consent to its privacy
policy prior to registration and thereby strengthening the legal impact of enforcing
privacy interests (high impact).
Regarding the technical perspective, several means of enforcing OSN user
privacy preferences are available (see Sects. 5.1 and 5.2). However, their overall
practical impact is minor, taking into consideration that these tools are often
prohibited by the service provider’s general terms and conditions.
While social norms have a significant impact on enforcing privacy interests
toward other users (see Sect. 4.6), there is typically no social relationship between a
social web service provider and its users. As a consequence, the power structures of
social groups do not apply. In addition, the effect of mass media coverage is limited
in its ability to put pressure on service providers, as outlined in Sect. 5.5. Thus,
privacy interests toward service providers cannot be socially enforced (no impact).
Figure 5a shows the dominance of legal remedies on the enforcement of privacy
preferences.
5.7 Summary
Table 3 summarizes the results of our analysis of privacy issues related to OSN
service providers. Two major conclusions can be derived. First, a shift of impact
from the social dimension to the legal dimension, as compared to the results of
Sect. 4, can be seen. Second, our results show a general increase in the impact of all
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dimensions compared to the impact of Sect. 4.7. In particular, the major legal
impact is noteworthy and shows that legislators realize the existence of an unequal
distribution of power. Consequently, they try to strengthen the position of OSN
users. In contrast, the minor impact of social norms can be explained by a diffusion
of responsibility. Service providers are typically not embedded in an individual’s
social structure; thus, social norms do not apply. Similar to the results described in
Sect. 4.7, technical tools can be seen as a supportive in nature, although their impact
is often limited. Finally, the limited means of all three dimensions to protect an
individual against profiling is noteworthy, emphasizing the service providers’
efforts to protect their business model.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
The rising popularity of online social networks poses many challenges in the field
of privacy. Unlike the real world in which personal information is ephemeral, in the
online-world, such information is almost infinitely available. This poses great
challenges in managing identities online, and in context-sensitive sharing of per-
sonal information with other users. In addition, the prevalent oligopolistic social
web landscape threatens privacy as it fosters the growth of identity silos.
We proposed an interdisciplinary approach to address the aforementioned pri-
vacy risks. Consequently, as the main contribution of this chapter, we developed a
framework to systematically analyze social web privacy issues from a legal,
technical, and social perspective. Furthermore, the impact of these three different
perspectives on privacy among OSN users themselves, and between OSN users and
service providers, has been highlighted based on a thorough literature review. Our
results support our initial assumption that the challenges of social web privacy
cannot be addressed from a single direction; rather, they must be addressed by a
comprehensive interdisciplinary approach.
Our results lead to a variety of research directions for future work. For example,
the role of technology in pursuing social privacy violations should be investigated
Table 3 Summary of OSN service provider-related privacy impact analysis
Data
sovereignty
Data
transience
Protection
ag.
Profiling
Privacy
awareness Transparency Enforcement
Legal
Technical
Social
Impact: Dark ¼ major, Mid ¼ medium, Light ¼ minor
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in detail. Additionally, we wish to overcome the limitations of subjective and
qualitative characterizations of privacy effects by conducting a quantitative study
to investigate social web privacy based on the framework presented in this chapter.
This could lead to a further convergence of research activities.
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